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ABSTRACT
This paper summarizes the results of several case
studies using the Global Positioning System coverage
model developed at Ohio University. Presented are
results pertaining to outage area, outage dynamics, and
availability. Input parameters to the model include the
satellite orbit data, service area of interest, geometry
requirements, and horizon and antenna mask angles. It
is shown for precision-landing Category I requirements
that the planned GPS 21 Primary Satellite Constellation
produces significant outage area and unavailability. It
is also shown that a decrease in the user equivalent
range error dramatically decreases outage area and
improves the service availability.
1. INTRODUCTION
An excellent summary documenting the impending
need for a comprehensive Global Positioning System
(GPS) satellite coverage model is given in [1]. To be
complete, this summary is repeated here:
"The continuous movement of navigation satellites with
respect to the surface of the earth results in continual
changes of the system coverage. There may be times
when the number of satellites in view of an aircraft near
a particular airport would be less than that required for
executing a precision approach. The periods of time
when precision approach coverage will be inadequate
at given airports must be known well in advance in
order that operations may be resmcted.
A satellite-based precision approach system requires a
high level of availability within the service region to
ensure operational suitability of the system. At the
present time, a precise requirement for availability is
not defined; however, preliminary studies indicate that
system unavailability should be well below one minute
per day. Critical sources of unavailability result from
poor satellite geometry, planned satellite down time,
known satellite failures, and planned ground
equipment down time (e.g., a differential reference
station). Thus the majority of the satellite system
unavailability is predictable. The primary
consequence of predictable unavailability is the need
to schedule around the known outages. Since a single
satellite covers a large geographical area, a satellite
outage could potentially affect a large service area.
This would result in major operation, capacity, and
economic concerns. For instance, a one-hour outage in
a metropolitan area would result in multiple
simultaneous missed approaches and simultaneous
replanning for many aircraft in the air.
Note that unpredictable outages are primarily a safety
concern because of their significant effect on the
guidance of aircraft during the approach and landing
phase. The contribution of unpredictable outages to
the overall system unavailability is anticipated to be
small compared to the predictable outages, but this
assumption must be verified.
A computer model would be used initially to
characterize the coverage, and to analyze the size,
duration, and dynamics of the outage areas under a
wide variety of failure scenarios and for different
system architectm'es. Input parameters to the model
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Table 2.1 Case-Study Initial Conditionswould include the service area of interest, satellite orbit
data. geometry requirements, horizon and antenna mask
angles, and satellite reliability data.
The descent of the aircraft while on an approach, along
with the movement of navigation satellites, may also
result in different optimal sets of satellites guidance at
the initiation and at the conclusion of the approach.
The impact of using a four or five channel receiver with
potential satellite switching during the approach versus
an all-in-view receiver must be addressed. The
computer model can then be used as a tool to evaluate
different system architectures.
...The criticality of this issue is judged to be HIGH,
since coverage definition is necessary for the assurance
of adequate system performance."
In order to address the GPS coverage issues, the Ohio
University Avionics Engineering Center has been
developing a comprehensive GPS coverage model The
different modules that comprise the model have been
used in various applications as documented in reference
[2]. This paper summarizes the most recent
developments and highlights the model's unique
features and capabilities. The results of several case
studies are presented in order to gain an appreciation for
the types of parametric studies the model will facilitate.
The presentation concludes with a brief summary of
additional work that is necessary in order to allow the
GPS Coverage model to be used as a=complete system-
analysis tool. It should be emphasized that the current
model is capable of evaluating not only the present
satellite architecture, but will eventually become a tool
for designing and evaluating alternative satellite-based
navigation architectures to meet precision-approach
requirements.
2. CASE STUDIES
2.1 Introduction
This section details the results of several case studies
involving the various modules which comprise the
coverage model. For each case study presented, the test
conditions are stated and results given. This is followed
by a discussion and summary of the important
conclusions.
The two case-study scenarios analyzed by the coverage
model are summarized in Table 2.1. The parameters
displayed in the table were chosen for validation
purposes and to determine a near-global perspective on
the system performance. Although these were chosen
to be representative of the model's capabilities,
additional work is still needed in order to develop
minimum standards for time and space increments.
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Test
Conditions
Max. N Lat.
Max. S Lat.
Max W Long.
Max. E Long.
Increment
Min. HDOP
Min. VDOP
Min. PDOP
Analysis Time
Time Increment
Constellation
Test 1
(World)
90 °
-90 °
-180 °
0o
5°
6
24 hours
5 minutes
Optimal 21
Test 2
North America)
75 °
15°
-170 °
-50 °
6 °
2.3
9.2
24 hours
6 minutes
21 Primary
2.2 Case Study I: Counting Outages
As a first attempt at outage characterization, the
duration and number of zero-failed satellite outagesat
eaCh-ioe-atioh in the search =g-rid were =determined.
Figure 2.1 shows the Test-1 (World) outage contours.
This result is essentially the same as that presented by
Jorgensen [3]. Note that, in this case, even the
complete constellation results in substantial outages.
This is due to the fundamental limitations imposed by
using the Optimal 21 Satellite Constel!ation. The
inclusion of this result is not intended to be an analysis
of the Optimal 21 Cohsteilatlon, but "is presented
because of its importand_to =the validation of our
model. The case studies shown throughout the
remainder of the paper will be concerned exclusively
with the GPS 21 Primary Satellite Constellation [4].
2.3 Case Study H: Outage Areas versus DOP
Shown in Table 2.2 are the Vertical Dilution of
Precision (VDOP) requirements for the various
categories of approach assuming a 6-foot user
equivalent range error (95%) [5]. Table 2.3 expands
upon this for the Category I landing by showing the
required VDOP for different values of user equivalent
range error (UERE). Throughout the paper, the
required maximum allowable FIDOP was chosen to be
four times the specified VDOP.
The effect of varying DOP requirements (VDOP
and/or HDOP) is of particular importance, especially
when considering precision-approach issues. To
determine the impact that the DOP requirement has on
outage area, the model was used to characterize the
outages based on the initial conditions set forth in Test
2 (North America). For this test, the GPS 21 Primary
Constellation (as shown in Figure 2.2) was analyzed at
three different DOP values for up to three failed
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Figure 2. I Accumulated Outages Per Day for Test 1.
Contours show regions of degraded performance based
on no failures in the Optimal 21 Satellite Constellation.
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Figure 2.2 The GPS 21 Primary Satellite Constellation.
The satellite numbering is based on the order in which
the satellite ephemeris data is entered into the model.
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satellites.Table2.4summarizesthe worst and average
satellite-failure combinations for each DOP condition.
Table 2.2 Vertical Accuracy as a Function of VDOP
Vertical
Approach Requirement
Category (feet, 95%)
I 13.5
II 5.6
III 2.0
Note: Satellite numbering is based on Figure 2.2.
Table 2.3 The CatI Approach:
UERE
fit, 95%)
VDOP
Requirement
2.3
4.6
13.8
Table 2.4
The most important observation that can be made
based on an analysis of the data contained in Table 2.4
is that the worst- and average-failure combinations
VDOP change as a function of HDOP and VDOP. This is
Requirement evidence to the fact that the coverage pr0vided by the
21 Primary GPS Constellation is highly nonlinear and
2.3 nonuniform. Figure 2.3 also illustrates this nonlinearity
by graphically displaying the average and worst-case
0.9 outage areaas a function of DOP and =the number of
failed satellites. To further illustrate this nonlinearity,
0.3 consider Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Shown here are the ratios
of 0utage_decrease as a function of VDOP (and
I-IDOP) relaxation. For example, from the worst-case
VDOP and UERE single fail_ of TaMe 2.5 it can be seen that relaxing
the (I-IDOP, VDOP) requirement by a factor of six
Associated .... decreases the corresponding outage area by a factor of
HDOP 210, with pronounced area reductions occurring in the
other cases as well. It is also interesting that DOP
9.2 relaxation has a greater effect on the average failure
combination than on the worst-case failure
18.4 combination. This may be due to the fact that the
worst-case failure combinations are highly sensitive to
55.2 DOP requirements.
Worst and Average Satellite Failures
Wors t
Single Failure
Average
Single Failure(HDOP, VDOPI
(9.2, 2.3) (22) (11)
(18.4, 4.6) (8) (16)
(55.2, 13.8) (22) (20)
Worst Average
Double Failure Double Failure
(9.2, 2.3) (9, 22) (5, 11)
(18.4, 4.6) (6, 9) (9, 20)
(55.2, 13.8) (20, 22) (5, 24)
(9.2, 2.3)
Worst
Triple Failure
(10, 15, 22)
(3, 6, 9)
(1, 8, 22)
(18.4, 4.6)
Average
Triple Failure
(1, 8, 23)
(9, 10, 16)
(8, 11, 19)(55.2,13.8)
Table 2.5 VDOP Relaxation and Outage Area
(The Worst-Case Satellite Failure)
Relax VDOP Relax VDOP
Number of
failed SVs (2.3 : 4.6) (2.3 : 13.8)
(1 : 2) (1 : 6)
0 30.64 752.05
1 15.08 210.10
2 5.93 25.94
3 3.37 7.91
Table 2.6 VDOP Relaxation and Outage Area
(The Average Satellite Failure)
Number of
failed SVs
Relax VDOP
(2.3 : 4.6)
(1:2)
30.64
Relax VDOP
(2.3 : 13.8)
(1:6)
752.050
1 20.25 356.22
2 12.66 109.91
8.50 44.34
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Figure 2.3 Worst-Case and Average Outage Area Parameterization.
Shown is the zero-failure outage area along with the worst-case and
average single-, double-, and triple-satellite failures as a function of DOP.
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The histograms for the three-satellite failure case are
shown in Figure 2.4. These demonstrate the
distribution of failure combinations and the resulting
_utage areas. In each of the histograms it can be seen
that the number of failure combinations close to the
average is much greater than those close to the
maximum. Thus, while averaging is not justified as a
stand-alone means of system parametrization, it may be
sufficient for a first-order approximation of system
performance.
2.4 Case Study HI: Outage Dynamics
A very important feature of the current model is the
ability to generate movies, or slides, which give a time-
dependent record of the outage areas. Figure 2.5 shows
the outages generated during five consecutive five-
minute intervals. The frames were generated using the
Test-2 (North America) conditions. The outage
contours are the result of failing satellites 1, 4, and 5
with a (H:DOP, VDOP) requirement of (55.4, 13.8).
The slides demonstrate that huge outages can appear
and disappear very quickly. As one might expect, the
outage contours generally exhibit an easterly
movement. However, it also appears that the _P
requirements dictate outages more than the overall
movement of the satellites. This is evidenced by the
appearance and disappearance of the large outage areas.
The implication of these results is especially important
when considering the outage-based alternate-airport
issue. For an en route aircraft navigating in the middle
of an outage area, the most probable course of action
would be to maintain course and wait for the outage to
dissipate. For an aircraft navigating in the terminal
area, the issue of landing at an alternate airport is rather
mute. Unless the primary airport is on the outside
border of an outage, the probability of finding a suitable
alternate airport is prohibitively low. Again, the most
likely course of action would be to wait for the outage
to dissipate. The situation is somewhat analogous to an
aircraft entering a terminal with a single instrument
landing system (ILS). If the ILS were to fail during an
approach, a missed approach procedure would be taken,
followed by further instructions from the ground station
to the pilot. If an approach were being flown using
GPS and an outage occurred, a monitoring station
equipped with the GPS coverage model could quickly
determine the nature and extent of the outage. Using a
model capable of predicting the movement of the
current outage, the pilot could be advised of the best
course of action. While more work is undoubtedly
needed in this area, the ability to track outages as a
function of time should prove to be of great value in the
evaluation of satellite-based navigation systems.
2.5 Case Study IV: Availability
To determine the availability (and subsequent
unavailability) for each location in the North American
search grid. the Markov state probabilities shown in
Table 2.7 were used [5-8].
Table 2.7 Steady-State Markov Probabilities
Number of Markov Cumulative
failed SVs Probabilities Probability
0 0.703 O.703
1 O.227 0.930
2 0.055 0.985
3 0.012 0.997
4 0.002 0.999
5 0.00042 0.99942
0.000071 0.9994916
In order to create an outage record of workable size in
the current computing environment, system
availability was calculated by only considering up to
three failed satellites. Thus, the maximum availability
wouldnecessarily be limited to 0.997, or an
unavailability of 0.003 (1.000 - 0.997). This is
equivalent to a minimum system unavailability of 4.32
minutes per day. While only allowing for three
satellite failures seems somewhat prohibitive, it will be
seen in the next section that the majority of
unavailability is accounted for in just considering up to
three satellite failures. Shown in Figure 2.6 are the
unavailability contours for !he ,North American
continent. The plots dramatize the expected
unavailability of the GPS 2 } Primary Satellite
Constellation as a function of location and dilution of
precision. It is interesting to note the high degree of
location dependency in each of the contours. From the
contours it is evident that the stringent DOP
req-uitement of _P = 9.2, and VDOP = 2.3) results
in substantial unavailability (2-7 hours) whereas the
least stringent requirement (HDOP = 55.4, and VDOP
= 13.8) results in significantly lower overall
unavailability approachin-g the'_alysis-imposed 4.32
minutes-per-day limit.
The ratios of maximum and average unavailability as a
function of DOP are summarized in Table 2.8. In
comparing Table 2.8 with its counterparts for outage
area (Tables 2.5 and 2.6), we see that relaxation of the
DOP requirements h_ a similar nonlinear affect_ on
unavailability. Also, it is again seen that the effect is
greater on the average than at the extremes. In the
68
Triple SV Failure Histogram (I-IDOP = 9.2, VDOP = 2.3),,rl-¢---i
II
"5
O
E
o
L)
5O0
0
0.9 1.5
xl09
t'q
¢.-q
I1
..A
O
E
O
L)
8OO
6OO
400
200
0
0
Triple SV Failure Histogram (HDOP = 18.4, VDOP = 4.6)
O.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Outage area (nautical miles)2
4.5
xl08
¢-q 1500
t"4
II
 1o00
._ 500
.__
_ 0
O
Triple SV Failure Histogram (HDOP = 55.2, VDOP = 13.8)
0 0.5 i
Outage area (nautical miles)2
1.5 2
xl08
Figure 2.4 Triple Satellite Failure Histograms.
The number of triple satellite failures causing the
specified outage area is given as a function of DOP.
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Figure 2.5 Outage dynamics as a function of time.
Contours show outage regions as a result of failing
satellites 1, 4, and 5 with a dilution of precision
requirement of (VDOP = 13.8, HDOP = 55.2).
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Figure 2.6 3-Dimensional Unavailability Contours.
The three contour plots show unavailability as a
function of location and dilution of precision (DOP).
next section, the model will be appliedto a'lir_ted
number of important locations in order to determine if
they are representative of the entire North American
search region.
Table 2.8 VDOP Relaxation: Worst and Avg. Unavail.
Number of
failed SVs
Worst-Case
Unavailability
Average
Unavailability
Relax VDOP
(2.3 : 4.6)
(I :2)
10.92
14.65
Relax VDOP
(2.3 : 13.8)
(1:6)
24.92
33.11
2.6 Case Study V: Specific Airports
In an attempt to develop a benchmark for demmfining
the number of satellite failures needed to best quantify
the current system, the model was used to calculate the
maximum and average unavailability experienced by
the ten busiest airports in the United States (as
reported by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association). Table 2.9 lists the name and location of
these airports.
Table 2.9 The AOPA Ten Busiest U.S. Airports
Airport Name Airport Location
I. Chicago O'Haxe Int'l
2. Atlanta Int'l
3. DaUas/FL Worth Int'l
4. Los Angeles Int'l
5. Santa Aria
6. Van Nuys
7. Phoenix Sky Hrbr. Int'I
8. Long Beach
9. Denver Stapleton Int'I
10. Miami Int'l
41058 ' N 87054 ' W
33°38 ' N 84"35' W
32053 ' N 97002 ' W
33056 , N 118024 ' W
33040 ' N 117052 ' W
34"12' N 118029' W
33026 ' N 112"00' W
33°49' N 118"09' W
39046 ' N 104"52' W
25"47' N 80"17' W
Source: AOPA 1992 Fact Card (1990 Data), Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association, Frederick, Maryland.
For these locations, the model was run for up to and
including six satellite failures. The maximum and
average unavailabilities for failing 3, 4, 5, and 6
satellites for the ten busiest general aviation airports
axe shown in Table 2.10. These values are based on
the Category I requirement of (I-IDOP = 9.2, VDOP =
2.3) assuming a UERE of 6 ft. (95%).
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From Table2.10 itcan be seen thaLon theaverage,the
differencein the computed unavailabilityfor running
themodel to threefailuresisonly about two percent
higherthanrunningthe model toitscurrentlimitof six
failures. This appears to indicate thak in order to obtain
a good approximation of system availability, the model
need only consider up to three satellite failures.
Naturally,asdiffwentconstellationsare evaluated,this
assumption may no longer be valid and will require
further investigation. It is worth noting that, while none
of these airports represent the maximum unavailability
discussed previously, they are representative of the
average of the entire search grid to within 22%, or
approximately 30 minutes of unavailability. While this
seems to be a rough approximation, it may be justified
in instances where a quick check is sufficient.
Table 2.10 Unavailability Calculations
Max. number
of failed SVs
Maximum
Unavailability
(hout_/day)
Average
Unavailability
(hours/day)
2.90 2.17
2.87 2.14
2.86 2.14
2.86 2.13
3. SUMMARY
The characterization of outages in the coverage
provided by the Global Positioning System is of utmost
importance when considering GPS as a sole means of
navigation and as a navigation aid for flying a precision
approach. The continued development of the Ohio
University GPS coverage model will enable detailed
parametric studies of various coverage issues. The
application of the model was demonstrated through
several representative case studies. These studies
showed how various Dilution of Precision (DOP)
requirements affect system performar_e.
Future work will include designing and running
additional simulations to determine key system
parameters. The model presented in this report will
serve as a foundation for the development of a complete
coverage model with the capacity of evaluating (and
thus designing) a robust satellite-based navigation
system.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported by the FAA under contract
DTRS-57-87--c-O0006, and the FAA and NASA through
the Joint University Program (Grant NGR 36-009-017).
The author wishes to express his thanks to Dr. Frank
van Graas for his guidance and to Mohamed Shaltot for
his assistance.
REFERENCES
[I] "Engineeringand OperationalIssuesAssociated
with theApplicationof Satellite-BasedNavigation to
PrecisionApproach and Landing-FinalReport,"FAA's
John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems
Center,Cambridge, MA, December, 1991. Contracts
DTRS-57-89-D00043 and DTRS-57-87-C-00006.
[2] van Graas, Frank. "Final Report, OU/AEC 17-
89TM (XXX)6/22, GPS/LORAN InteropexabilityPhase
IL" Avionics Engineering Center,Ohio University,
April1989.
[3] Green, G.B., Massatt, P.D., Rhodus, N.W. "The
GPS 21 Primary Satellite Constellation," Navigation,
Vol. 34, No. 4, Winter, 1987-88, pp. 9-24.
[4] Jorg_lsen, Paul S. "Achieving GPS Integrityand
Eliminating Areas of Degraded Performance,"
Navigation, Vol. 34, No. 4, Winter, 1987-88, pp_.97-
306.
[5] Creamer, P.M., Geyer, E.M., Pisano, JJ. "GPS
Availability and Reliability for Aircraft Precision
Approach," ION National Technical Meeting, San
Diego, CA, January,1992.
[6] Durand, J-M and Caseau, A. "GPS Availability,
Part I: Availabilityof Service Achievable for
Different Categoriesof Civil User," Navigation, Vol.
37, No. 2, Summer, 1990, pp. 123-139.
[7] Durand, J-M and Caseau, A. "GPS Availability,
Part If: Evaluation of State Probabilitiesfor 21
Satellite and 24 Satellite Consmlladons," Navigation,
Vol. 37, No. 3, Fall, 1990, pp. 285-296.
[8] Kline, Paul A. "Fault Detection And Isolation For
Integrated Navigation Systems Using The Global
Positioning System," Masters Thesis, Ohio
University, November, 1991.
72
